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Montesquieu's Theory of Government




We have said that the laws were the particular and precise institutions of a
legislator, and manners and customs the institutions of a nation in general.
Hence it follows that when these manners and customs are to be changed, it
ought not to be done by laws; this would have too much the air of tyranny: it
would be better to change them by introducing other manners and other
customs.
Thus when a prince would make great alterations in his kingdom, he should
reform by law what is established by law, and change by custom what is set-
tled by custom.1
Two hundred and forty years after Montesquieu admonished rulers
to respect the natural divisions of authority within their societies, his
work continues to guide politicians and jurists alike. In Mistretta v.
United States,2 the United States Supreme Court held that the sen-
tencing guidelines for federal convicts promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission were constitutional despite the fact
that Article III federal judges were members of the Commission.
This holding has had broad contemporary significance. Courts
throughout the nation had taken opposite views on the constitution-
ality of the guidelines, resulting in a plethora of inconsistent and con-
stitutionally suspect criminal sentences. Yet, even in the midst of an
opinion suffused with such contemporary import, the Supreme Court
* Law Clerk to Judge Bobby R. Baldock, U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
B.A. Reed College (1986); J.D. Northwestern School of Law, Lewis & Clark College
(1989). I am grateful to John C. Pock for first exposing me to Montesquieu and help-
ing me pursue this project. I also would like to thank Peter Nycum and James
Huffman for their helpful comments, Doris J. Brook for her help with translation, and
the library staff of Lewis & Clark Law School.
1. MONTEsQUIEU, THE SPInRT OF THE LAWS 298 (T. Nugent 1949).
2. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
invoked the authority of Montesquieu, an eighteenth century French
legal theorist:
While we recognize the continuing validity of Montesquieu's admonition:
"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul" . . . because Congress
vested the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines in an independent
agency, not a court, there can be no serious argument that Congress combined
legislative and judicial power within the Judicial branch.3
A close reading of many of the Supreme Court's most significant
decisions reveals that Montesquieu's influence prevails some two
hundred and forty years after the publication of his The Spirit of the
Laws.4 Montesquieu was cited by the Supreme Court in both Bow-
sher v. Synar,5 which struck down the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduc-
tion bill as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and
Buckley v. Valeo,6 a case upholding the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Election Commission. The Supreme Court also invoked Montes-
quieu's authority in I.N.S. v. Chadha,7 a decision that struck down the
legislative veto of administrative decisions.8 Although Montesquieu
is usually remembered for his discussion of the separation of powers,
in the last half century the Supreme Court has also relied upon his
authority on such issues as perjury,9 treason' 0 and the Smith Act.i1
State courts have cited Montesquieu on such topics as domestic rela-
tions,12 perjury,13 penal reform,14 and voluntary intoxication.' 5 In-
deed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia discussed
Montesquieu's theories in connection with the impeachment of a fed-
eral judge.16
Despite these numerous citations, however, Montesquieu remains
an enigmatic figure in American legal education. Although courts
generally acknowledge his influence on the Constitution, the nature
3. Id. at 394.
4. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1.
5. 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
6. 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing James Madison's reliance on
Montesquieu in THE FEDERALIST NO. 47).
7. 462 U.S. 919, 999 n.25 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
8. See also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Appointment of
independent special prosecutor held to be an unconstitutional violation of the separa-
tion of powers), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
9. Bronston v. United States, 408 U.S. 352, 360 (1973), rev'd, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
10. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1945) (The treason clause of the Con-
stitution embodies every precept suggested by Montesquieu).
11. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 266 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 590 n.5 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12. Warren v. Hart, 747 P.2d 511, 514 n.1 (Wyo. 1987).
13. State v. Olson, 92 Wash. 2d 134, 139, 594 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1979).
14. Smith v. State, 41 Md. App. 297, 289, 398 A.2d 426, 434 (1979).
15. Parker v. State, 7 Md. App. 167, 176 n.1, 254 A.2d 381, 387 n.1 (1969).
16. In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833 F.2d 1438, 1443 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d. 1093, 1106
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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and extent of his contributions remain untold. Montesquieu is per-
functorily cited in connection to Madison's separation of powers dis-
cussion in The Federalist No. 47;17 yet the context in which this quote
arose remains ambiguous. Conventional wisdom has confined Mon-
tesquieu's influence to the separation of powers, ignoring his greater
influence in theorizing the relationship between republican govern-
ment and republican political culture.
Part II of this paper chronicles Montesquieu's life and evaluates his
jurisprudence, emphasizing his treatment of law and culture and the
dialectical relationship between the two phenomena. Part III of this
paper traces Montesquieu's influence in America from the colonial
period through the early 1800s, and demonstrates how Montesquieu
provided theoretical grounding for popular political sentiments in op-
position to the English Monarchy and later influenced the framing of
the United States Constitution. This section also illustrates how
Montesquieu influenced the ratification debate by providing intellec-
tual ammunition to both sides of the struggle. Part IV demonstrates
Montesquieu's influence upon Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison and Ad-
ams from their early infatuation with his theories in the pre-revolu-
tionary era to their more critical approach after the formation of the
new republic. Finally, Part V discusses several early Supreme Court
cases which cite Montesquieu, as examples of his continuing and ec-
lectic influence. Part VI concludes by commenting on Montesquieu's
continuing and future impact on American jurisprudence.
This paper does not attempt to provide an exhaustive history of the
intellectual origins of the Constitution, for such an endeavor would
in itself constitute a separate study.18 Rather, the paper will summa-
rize Montesquieu's theories and chronicle their implementation
across the American continent. By clarifying Montesquieu's theories
and demonstrating their application during the formative years of the
republic, this paper seeks to restore the ideas of this great thinker to
contemporary legal and political discourse. While the specific con-
tent of Montesquieu's analysis is dated, his theory of natural govern-
ment can provide guidance to the contemporary quandary over the
proper role of government in the regulation of our daily lives.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323-31 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); see Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (per curiam) (discussing James Madison's reliance on
Montesquieu's theories).
18. For a superb treatment of this subject, see F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
II. MONTESQUIEU: LIFE AND THEORY
A. Life & Times
Charles-Louis de Secondat was born to a Bordeaux family of mag-
istrates, soldiers and ecclesiastics on January 18, 1689.19 Preparing
for a career as a magistrate, Charles-Louis studied Roman, French,
and local law at the University of Bordeaux, and received his degree
in 1708.20 The following year he consummated his Enlightenment ra-
tionality by composing an essay which argued that the "heathen phi-
losophers did not deserve eternal damnation."21 After further study
in Paris, Charles-Louis was appointed to the Bordeaux Parlement as
a Councilor in 1714. Even at this early stage he was an uncommonly
well-educated lawyer.22
Following his uncle's death in 1716, Charles-Louis inherited not
only the title Montesquieu, but also an income, and the judicial post
of President a Mortier of the Bordeaux Parlement.23 Although the
Parlements of the Ancient Regime performed some administrative
function, their primary role was judicial.24 Montesquieu presided
over the criminal division - Tournelle - of the Parlement through-
out his eleven year tenure.25 As part of his duties, he supervised the
prison system, participated in torture - a routine part of criminal in-
vestigation - and sentenced prisoners to the standard punishments
of execution, deportation, and service in the galleys.26 Partially as a
result of this experience, Montesquieu would later become a firm ad-
vocate of criminal law reform.27
Although he retained his interest in the law, Montesquieu grew
bored with its day-to-day administration; he especially disliked proce-
dure.28 Moreover, other concerns competed for his intellectual atten-
tion. The same year Montesquieu assumed his judicial post he was
elected to the Bordeaux Academy of Science. 29 Soon his scientific in-
terests outweighed his devotion to the law. While still a practicing
judge, he published papers on physics, physiology, geology, and other
natural science topics, including the origin of the echo and the anat-
19. I. BERLIN, MONTESQUIEU 269 (1955); J. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 1 (1987).
20. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 2.
21. A. SOREL, MONTESQUIEU 10 (Anderson trans. 1969).
22. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 2.
23. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at x. Presidents a Mortier, named for their red
hats, were nine magistrates on the second rung of the Parlement. J. SHKLAR, supra
note 19, at 4. All offices except the presidency were bought, sold, leased or inherited.
Id.
24. I. Cox, MoNTsQUIE AND THE HIsTORY OF FRENCH LAws 55 (1983).
25. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also W. BONGER AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY 30-34 (1936).
28. Id. See J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 5.
29. 1 R. ARON, MAIN CURRENTS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT 63 (1968).
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omy of the kidney.3 0 A bitter critic of the religious intolerance and
military aggression carried out under the regime of Louis XIV,31
Montesquieu presented essays to the Academy on public finance, uni-
versal monarchy, and the decline of the Spanish Empire,3 2 in addi-
tion to his scientific works. Montesquieu's early identification as a
man of sciences would prove central to his later development as a
political theorist.33
In 1721, Montesquieu made his literary debut with the publication
of The Persian Letters, a work comprised of a satirical evaluation of
French society through the eyes of two fictional Turkish travelers.
The Persian Letters made Montesquieu instantly famous. Although
the book had been published anonymously, his authorship was not
much of a secret. 34 While the work was well-received, Montesquieu's
tolerant view of Judaism was criticized by the clergy.
A disaffected aristocrat, Montesquieu sold his judicial office in
1725, giving up the life of a provincial magistrate for the literary
glamor of Paris.35 The year 1728 saw Montesquieu's election to the
Academe Francaise, although he was first required to affirm that The
Persian Letters was not a blasphemous book.36 He spent the follow-
ing year travelling in Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, meeting
with local economic and political elites.3 7 Montesquieu then spent
two years in England conducting an intensive study of English polit-
ical institutions. He became acquainted with many Whig leaders, ob-
served sessions of the House of Commons, and maintained an active
correspondence with David Hume.3 8 In 1731, Montesquieu was
elected to the Royal Society. 39
30. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at xi.
31. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 17-18.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Professor Shklar explains:
The very core of [Montesquieu's] political theory depended on ideas about the
ways in which the physical environment, especially the climate, impinges
upon human character and political institutions, and he built from the first
out of materials he had gathered in his reading of the works of physicians. It
was they who gave his mind its particular cast. Like them he wanted to de-
velop a science capable of identifying and describing the course of diseases, ex-
cept that he was looking not at physical illnesses but at social collapse and the
deadly condition of despotism.
Id. at 12.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. MoNTEsQuIEu, supra note 1, at xii.
39. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 21.
Montesquieu's experiences in England radicalized him. He discov-
ered that the rule of law and political freedom were practical pos-
sibilities, and Burbon absolutism was not inevitable. 40 In 1734,
Montesquieu published Considerations sur la grandeur at la deca-
dence des Romains, which analyzed the decline of the Roman Em-
pire.41 His thesis was that Rome fell when its legal institutions
reached a level of sophistication that could not be supported by its
primitive religious system.42 This work was to be an important pre-
cursor to The Spirit of the Laws.
As a result of his previous publications, Montesquieu was widely
known and respected when The Spirit of the Laws was first pub-
lished in 1748. The result of twenty years of preparation, The Spirit
of the Laws combined Montesquieu's entire intellectual experience as
a judge, scientist, novelist, historian and traveller.43 It was intended
as a "scientific study of government, encompassing the whole length
and breadth of history and accounting for all the factors affecting the
political life of man."44 Montesquieu's work was hailed as the first
systematic treatise on politics since Aristotle. All French intellectu-
als became familiar with the book, and twenty-two editions were
published within two years.45
Many felt that The Spirit of the Laws broke with earlier tradition
by studying the laws of different nations without reference to moral-
ity or metaphysics.46 Consequently, it was attacked at the Sorbonne,
and the French Assembly of Bishops threatened to ban the work.
For reducing laws to their purely human causes, "Montesquieu was
accused of atheism, of deism, of not having mentioned original sin
[and of] having condoned polygamy." 47 Helvetius and Voltaire also
criticized the book as a partisan defense of aristocratic privilege,48
although the former defended Montesquieu against attacks from the
Church.
In answer to his Jesuit and Jansenist critics, Montesquieu pub-
lished Defense of the Spirit of the Laws in 1750.49 He explained that
he had not sought to belittle morality, but rather to separate theology
40. Id.
41. See Oak, Montesquieu's Religious Ideas, 14 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 548, 548-51 (1953).
42. Id.
43. See J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 67 ("When one reads all of Montesquieu's
published and unpublished writings from beginning to end, one realizes that he had
been working on his masterpiece, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, all his life.").
44. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 76 (1967).
45. A. SOREL, supra note 21, at 162, 168.
46. M. WADDICOR, MONTESQUIEU AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL LAW 16
(1970).
47. L. ALTHUSSER, POLITICS AND HISTORY: MONTESQUIEU, ROUSSEAU, HEGEL AND
MARx 21 (B. Brewster trans. 1972).
48. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at xiii.
49. L. ALTHUSSER, supra note 47, at 22.
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from political history.50 For example, Montesquieu acknowledged
that polygamy was theologically abhorrent, but defended his tolera-
tion of the practice as the result of factual, not moral, considerations.
Two years after publishing Defense of the Spirit of the Laws he died
in Paris.
B. The Spirit of the Laws
1. Social Theory
Although an amateur scientist, Montesquieu was primarily a law-
yer, and The Spirit of the Laws "bears the marks of his profession."5 1
Combining his profession with his vocation, Montesquieu sought to
invent a science of government consistent with Cartesian and
Newtonian physics.5 2 As a search to integrate empirical and norma-
tive analysis, The Spirit of the Laws is widely acknowledged as the
first major work of social science.53
The Spirit of the Laws is not a mere compilation of the law, but
rather an entirely new method of approaching jurisprudence.54 Mon-
tesquieu sought to look beyond laws themselves and evaluate the so-
cial factors that gave them meaning and effect, and in so doing
effectuate the wise exercise of governmental power. His goal was
therefore threefold: 1) to define the structure of law and to classify
the entire array of social norms to reveal the legal structure of a
given society; 2) to demonstrate through historical analysis the dy-
namic relationship between social norms and laws; and 3) to alert his
countrymen to the dangers of despotism and foster the liberalization
and humanizing of the law in every area of social life. 5
To Montesquieu, "[1]aws are the necessary relations arising from
50. Id.
51. I. Cox, supra note 24, at 3.
52. According to Sir Isaiah Berlin:
[Montesquieu] speaks as if, for the first time in human history, he had uncov-
ered the fundamental laws which govern the behaviour of human societies,
much as natural scientists in the previous century had discovered the laws of
the behaviour of inanimate matter. He speaks of the genesis of legal systems,
but he obviously means something far wider: the entire, institutional frame-
work within which specific human societies live; not merely their systems of
law, but the patterns ...of their political, religious, moral, and aesthetic
behaviour.
I. BERLIN, supra note 19, at 271.
53. See L. ALTHUSSER, supra note 47, at 20.
54. See M. RICHTER, THE POITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU 57 (1977).
55. See J. SHKLAR, SUpra note 19, at 69.
the nature of things."56 These relationships, when analyzed system-
atically, combine to form the type of government best suited to a par-
ticular nation. Thus, Montesquieu asks jurists to look beyond the
written law to social, political, economic, cultural and geographical
exigencies that determine the spirit of nations. Only by appreciating
these relationships can governmental power be wisely exercised; only
by appreciating the "spirit" of laws can their letter be enforced.57
Montesquieu's Weltanschauung reflects an ordered universe gov-
erned by rational laws discoverable through reason.5 8 He thus
presumes underlying, enduring, and collaborative relationships be-
neath the chaos of human events.5 9 Justice, to Montesquieu, is im-
plicit within his jurisprudence, not simply some abstract
philosophical concept. Neither does a theory of natural rights figure
in his analysis.60 Rather, for Montesquieu, law and justice are insepa-
rable; one necessarily implies the other.6 1
Unlike Hobbes, Montesquieu never conceded a pre-social condition
of man, and accordingly rejected a contractual theory of social rela-
tions.6 2 Man, in the state of nature, uniformly seeks society; the so-
cial instinct is innate within humanity.6 3 While Hobbes saw man's
natural state as brutish, Montesquieu saw the social condition of man
as preeminent; the state of war only results from the breakdown of
the pre-existing social state.6 4 Moreover, Montesquieu rejected Hob-
56. MONTESQUIEU, Supra note 1, Bk. I, Ch. 1, at 1. Bereft of theistic content, this
relativist definition of law elicited the opprobrium of religious authorities when THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAws first appeared. See M. WADDICOR, supra note 46, at 181.
57. Montesquieu explains:
Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants
of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the
particular cases in which human reason is applied.
They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government:
whether they form it, as may be said of politic laws; or whether they support
it, as in the case of civil institutions.
They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of
its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives,
whether husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds: they should have relation to
the degree of liberty which the constitution will bear; to the religion of the
inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and
customs. In fine they have relations to each other, as also to their origin, to
the intent of the legislator, and to the order of things on which they are estab-
lished; in all of which different lights they ought to be considered.
These relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute... Spirit
of the Laws.
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. I, Ch. 2, at 6.
58. S. MASON, MONTESQUIEU'S IDEA OF JUSTICE 234-35 (1975).
59. H. MERRY, MONTESQUIEU'S SYSTEM OF NATURAL GOVERNMENT 60 (1970).
60. S. MASON, supra note 58, at 256.
61. See J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 72.
62. See M. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 68; S. MASON, supra note 58, at 213 (basic
tendency of Montesquieu's social theory anti-contractualist).
63. See L. LEViN, THE POLITICAL DOCTRINE OF MONTESQUIEU'S ESPRIT DES Los:
ITS CLASSICAL BACKGROUND 48 (1973).
64. See R. SHACKLETON, MONTESQUIEU: A CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY 262 (1961).
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bes' view of the law as the mere command of the sovereign; law is
preexistent and superordinate to political law.6 5
For Montesquieu, the criterion of proper government is not, as
with Plato, a transcendent idea of good, but rather an empirical sense
of social relations. Laws must be sociologically and culturally rele-
vant for the particular society and cannot be transplanted from one
nation to another.66 Montesquieu explicitly denied that any particu-
lar form of government is required by nature; every government is a
unique product of its natural and social environment. 67 From this
relativistic frame of reference, he sought to prove the impossibility of
a universal governmental solution to social problems. 68
2. Spirit of Nations
According to Montesquieu, mankind is influenced by various fac-
tors: climate, religion, laws, maxims of government, precedents,
morals, and customs. 69 These form a general "spirit of nations."70
Every society is thus characterized by a particular spirit, that force
which animates men to function harmoniously.71 This doctrine of na-
tional spirit gives coherence to The Spirit of the Laws by connecting
Montesquieu's divergent discussion of climate, geography, economics,
and religion with his analysis of governmental structure and political
liberty. Therefore, Montesquieu's most important and valuable idea
is the connection he established between the forms of governmental
power on one hand, and the style of social relations on the other.72
I have not separated the political from the civil institutions, as I do not pre-
tend to treat of laws, but of their spirit; and as this spirit consists in the vari-
ous relations which the laws may bear to different objects, it is not so much
my business to follow the natural order of laws as that of these relations and
objects. 7 3
While accepting a Cartesian proof of God's existence, 74 for Montes-
quieu, religion is a natural phenomenon brought about by natural
causes. Appreciating the psychological impulses behind religious af-
65. See J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 71.
66. H. MERRY, supra note 59, at 66-67..
67. Id. at 45.
68. See I. BERLIN, supra note 19, at 280.
69. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XIX, Ch. 4, at 293.
70. Id.
71. R. ARON, supra note 29, at 19.
72. Id. at 27.
73. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XXV, at Ch. 9-11.
74. Id. at 556.
firmation,75 Montesquieu regarded religion as a major social force
giving rise to a national spirit.76 As a result of this approach, he
adopted a utilitarian view of religion, seeing it as a functional prereq-
uisite to any society's existence. 77 Montesquieu sharply distinguished
the political realm from the religious. Political laws, according to
Montesquieu, are made to direct the will, whereas religion is created
to influence the heart.78 All political vices, he explained, "are not
moral vices; and all moral [vices] are not political vices." 79 This utili-
tarian view of religion gives rise to Montesquieu's powerful advocacy
of religious tolerance.8 0 Intolerance destroys the social utility of reli-
gion by loosening its naturally unifying force.8 '
3. Principle of Government
Montesquieu's greatest contribution to the character of modern
political theory is his identification of every government's own princi-
ple spirit or passion.8 2 'Montesquieu understood the vital relationship
between the cultural organization of a society on one hand and its
form of government on the other.
There is this difference between laws and manners, that the laws are most
adapted to regulate the actions of the subject, and manners to regulate the ac-
tions of the man. There is this difference between manners and customs, that
the former principally relate to the interior conduct, the latter to the
exterior.83
Every society is hence characterized by a particular governing senti-
ment from which no political structure can long deviate. Montes-
quieu understood that governments survive only so long as they
remain in conformity with the underlying spirit of the nation.
Laws are established, manners are inspired; these proceed from a general
spirit, those from a particular institution: now it is as dangerous, nay more so,
to subvert the general spirit as to change a particular institution.8 4
75. Id. Bk. XXV, at Ch. 9-11.
76. H. MERRY, supra note 59, at 115.
77. Montesquieu's earliest work, DISSERTION SUR LA POLITIQUE DES ROMAINS DANS
LAT RELIGION, read before the Bordeaux Academy, opened with the statement: "It was
neither fear nor piety which established religion among the Romans, but the' necessity
of all societies to possess one." See Oak, supra note 41, at 548-49.
78. Id.
79. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XIX, at Ch. 2. This refusal to subordinate
material and political facts to religious and moral principles or abstract notions of nat-
ural law constitutes Montesquieu's great theoretical revolution. See L. ALTHUSSER,
supra note 47, at 30.
80. In THE PERSIAN LETTERS, Montesquieu defended the Jewish faith against reli-
gious persecution. Although he regarded the Talmud and Cabala as absurd, he appre-
ciated the Jewish contribution toward monotheism and derided their barbaric
treatment by both religious and secular authorities. See P. KRA, RELIGION IN MONTES-
QUIEU'S LmrrREs PERSANES 101 (1970).
81. Oak, supra note 41, at 549; S. MASON, supra note 58, at 127.
82. H. MERRY, supra note 59, at 373.
83. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XIX, Ch. 16, at 300.
84. Id., Bk. XIX, Ch. 12, at 297-80.
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A political regime endures only as long as the necessary sentiment
remains in the people. Once the principle of government is abro-
gated, the political system ceases to function.
When once the principles of government are corrupted, the very best laws be-
come bad, and turn against the state: but when principles are sound, even bad
laws have the same effect as good; the force of the principle draws everything
to it. 8 5
Montesquieu therefore urged that political structure reflect the so-
ciological and psychological exigencies within the particular society
through the sociologically relevant distribution of power.8 6
It is the business of the legislature to follow the spirit of the nation, when it is
not contrary to the principle of government; for we do nothing so well as
when we act with freedom, and follow the bent of our natural genius. 8 7
By subordinating government to the general spirit of nations, Mon-
tesquieu posited a limiting force -like gravity- upon the acts of gov-
erning officials.88 This principle can be seen in Montesquieu's
discussion of the proper role of education in the society:
That the laws of education should relate to the principle of each government
has been shown.... Now the same may be said of those which the legislator
gives to the whole society. The relation of laws to this principle strengthens
the several springs of government; and this principle derives thence, in its
turn, a new degree of vigor. And thus it is in mechanics, that action is always
followed by reaction.8 9
Positive law, therefore, operates in a dialectical relationship with the
spirit of a nation; one can never deviate too far from the other lest
the social order be upset.
Should there happen to be a country whose inhabitants were of a social tem-
per, open-hearted, cheerful, endowed with taste and facility in communicating
their thoughts; who were sprightly and agreeable; sometimes imprudent, often
indiscreet; and besides had courage, generosity, frankness, and a certain no-
tion of honor, no one ought to endeavor to restrain their manners by laws, un-
less he would lay. a constraint on their virtues.9 0
Therein lies the source of Montesquieu's conservatism, that there
exists certain unbending constraints upon a government's ability to
85. Id., Bk. VII, Ch. 11, at 116.
86. Sorel explains that, for Montesquieu,
there is no sort of constitution which is, in itself, superior to others. There are
conditions of existence, public and private morals, a national spirit, a general
tendency, to which every constitution is subordinate. The best and most legit-
imate for each nation is that which is most appropriate to the character and
tradition of the people for which it was designed.
A. SOREL, supra note 21, at 89.
87. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XIX, Ch. 5, at 294.
88. See S. MASON, supra note 58, at 201.
89. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. V, Ch. 1, at 40.
90. Id., Bk. XIX, Ch. 5, at 294.
effectuate change within society.91 Like Burke, Montesquieu argued
that certain sociological exigencies could change only through time,
and that the governmental reformer who did not respect this truth
was certain to fail. Therefore, while Montesquieu's specific recom-
mendations were liberal, the implications of his broader theory were
fundamentally conservative.92
4. Three Types of Government
Montesquieu divided governments into republics, monarchies, and
despotisms.93 He then subdivided republics into democracies and ar-
istocracies. A republican government is one "in which the body, or
only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power; monar-
chy, that in which a single person governs by fixed and established
laws; despotic government [is] that in which a single person directs
everything by his own will and caprice." 94
Montesquieu categorized these three types of government, not ac-
cording to their structure, but rather by their legitimating principles
derived from the general spirit of the particular nation. Relying
upon classical Athens as his model,95 Montesquieu categorized virtue
as the governing principle of republican governments. The fragility
of republican constitutions require that republican government rely
on the habits and attitudes of the citizenry for support.96 Because the
people are entrusted with the execution of the laws, Montesquieu ex-
plained that their civic virtue provides the only force behind the
laws' authority:
There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or
despotic government. The force of laws in one and the prince's arm in the
other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state,
one spring more is necessary, namely virtue.
For it is clear that in a monarchy, where he who commands the execution
of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue
than in a popular government, where the person intrusted with the execution
of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.97
Where the republican government takes the form of democracy,
Montesquieu added frugality as a governing prerequisite. Otherwise,
personal ambition would prevail over the spirit of equality and sub-
vert the principle of democratic government.98 For this reason, Mon-
tesquieu argued that republican governments can only exist in small
91. See S. MASON, supra note 58, at 201 ("the practical expression of Montes-
quieu's sociological thesis seems inevitably restricted to an empirical conservatism").
92. See M. RicHTER, supra note 54, at 101.
93. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. II, Ch. 2, at 8.
94. Id.
95. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 76.
96. Id. at 79.
97. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. III, Ch. 3, at 20.
98. Id. at 21.
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territories.99 In contrast, where the republican government is aristo-
cratic, the virtuous sentiment need only manifest itself among the
governing nobility. Montesquieu favored this form of government as
more "vigorous" than democracy.l00
While a virtuous love of the law forms the governing principle of
republican government, in a monarchy, the laws are themselves vir-
tuous. Hence, Montesquieu described the governing principles in
monarchies as an honorific acknowledgement of the royal origin of
laws, and not, as in republics, a virtuous adherence to them. Never-
theless, laws in monarchical governments maintain an identity sepa-
rate from the sovereign, for an independent body of law forms the
only guard against despotism.10 '
Finally, Montesquieu ascribed fear as the governing principle of
despotic governments. Because the despot operates without any res-
ervoir of popular will, it is only the fear of his power that compels
obedience. Thus, the despot prevails only insofar as he is feared:
A moderate government may whenever it pleases, and without the least dan-
ger, relax its springs. It supports itself by the laws, and by its own internal
strength. But when a despotic prince ceases for one single moment to uplift
his arm, when he cannot instantly demolish those whom he has intrusted with
the first employments, all is over: for fear, the spring of this government, no
longer subsists, the people are left without a protector.1 0 2 ,
While Montesquieu undertook his study with admirable neutrality,
he evidenced a clear bias against despotism. 10 3 To the extent that
The Spirit of the Laws had a political purpose, it was to prevent
France from degenerating into despotism, an eventuality he both
feared and foresaw.10 4
5. The English Constitution and the Separation of Powers
Although Montesquieu is most famous for the separation of powers
doctrine, 105 this theory can be traced to classical times. Aristotle un-
derstood the divergence between making law and implementing law,
and articulated a crude separation between the legislative and execu-
99. Id., Bk. IX, at Ch. 1.
100. Id.
101. Montesquieu feared that France would degenerate into a Spanish style despot-
ism, and saw the independent Parlements as the primary bulwark against that eventu-
ality. See J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 81, 83.
102. Id. at 26.
103. M. WADDICOR, supra note 46, at 105-06.
104. J. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 81-83; A. SOREL, supra note 21, at 117.
105. I. BERLIN, supra note 19, at 268.
tive branches of government.106 The separation of powers theory was
also articulated in England during the civil war and the interregnum.
Following the restoration, the theory was expressed in demands for a
"balanced constitution."107 A concept of separation of powers is also
contained in the writings of Locke, although he clung to the Aristote-
lian division between executive and legislative.108
Although Montesquieu did not invent the separation of powers
doctrine, he was the first to comprehend a distinct and independent
judiciary.109 He popularized the trinity between the executive, legis-
lative, and judicial branches of government, and transposed separa-
tion of powers from the realm of theory to the practice of
government."l0
The essence of Montesquieu's separation of powers doctrine is not
separation of powers in the judicial sense but rather the balance of
social powers as a condition for political liberty.' "Liberty," for
Montesquieu, was not independence or license but rather a person's
security in his life and property.ll 2 Although he possessed great faith
in the power of legal systems to mold the public character, he was
sufficiently aware of the social necessity of placing the essential com-
ponents of the government in bodies representative of interests in so-
ciety."l3 Therefore, Montesquieu's three branches of government
represent three distinct sources of legal authority.11 4 In advocating
tripartite government, Montesquieu urged that governmental institu-
tions conform to this natural division between the functions of creat-
ing law, enforcing law, and adjudicating disputes arising under the
law.
Montesquieu derived his separation of powers theory from the
English Constitution. However, the England he describes in Chapter
Six of Book IX is an imaginary, "ideal-typical" country.11 5 For the
England that Montesquieu observed intertwined the powers of gov-
ernment, with the legislative branch endowed with supreme author-
ity."16 Montesquieu thus transformed the English idea of mixed
government from a partisan position to a universal criterion of con-
stitutional government.
Montesquieu saw three distinct forms of law, each corresponding to
106. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, Bk. II, Ch. 8 (Barker trans. 1962).
107. M.J.C. VILE, suprm note 44, at 53-54.
108. Id. at 56.
109. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at Ivii.
110. M. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 88.
111. R. ARON, supra note 29, at 30.
1i2. MONTESQUIEV, supra note 1, Bk. XI, at Ch. 3.
113. M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 86-87, 94.
114. H. MERRY, supra note 59, at 357.
115. M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 84-85.
116. A. McLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND PARTIES 52-54 (1912).
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a separate governmental function. The law of nations consists of the
power to promote public security, conduct foreign relations, and de-
clare war. It rests with the executive. The political law consists of
the power to make temporary or permanent laws and rests with the
legislature. Finally, the civil law consists of the power to adjudicate
civil and criminal matters and rests with the judiciary.1 7 In the
phrase for which he is most often quoted, Montesquieu warned that
these separate governmental functions remain separate and distinct:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehen-
sions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws,
to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and lib-
erty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with violence and oppression.1 18
In addition to advocating the separation of governmental powers,
Montesquieu recognized that only through a system of "checks" can
this separation be maintained. 1 9 Montesquieu favored an absolute
check upon the legislature through an executive veto. However,
under his theory, the legislature enjoys no commensurate check over
the executive, it merely maintains the right to force the' executive to
disgorge information on the manner in which its laws are exe-
cuted.120 Montesquieu justified this disparity in power with the no-
tion that the executive powers have "natural limits," functionally
defined, beyond which it cannot encroach. In contrast, as the maker
of political laws, the legislature "might arrogate to itself what author-
ity it please [which] would soon destroy all the other powers."'121
Montesquieu also advocated an internal check within the legislative
function through a bicameral legislature in which the nobility occu-
pies the upper house and the commoners the lower one.12 2 This
would assure that those "persons distinguished by their birth, riches,
or honors" are situated to "check the licentiousness of the people, as
the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs."123 He
explained:
Here, then, is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating
117. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 151-52.
118. Id. at 151-52.
119. M. RICHTER, supra note 54, at 91-92.
120. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 155-56.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 155.
123. Id.
of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, they check one another
by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the execu-
tive powers as the executive is by the legislative. These three powers should
naturally form a state of repose or inaction but as there is a necessity for
movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in
concert. 12 4
6. Judicial Power
Montesquieu's treatment of the judiciary requires further elabora-
tion, given its later development in the New World. While remaining
separate and distinct from the other two powers, Montesquieu urged
that the judicial power not be vested within a "standing senate."125
Rather, he proposed that the judiciary be'drawn from the people for
"only so long as necessity requires.' 126 "By this method", he argued,
"the judicial power, so terrible to mankind" will not be "annexed to
any particular state or profession."127
While endowing the judicial branch with significant powers, Mon-
tesquieu argued that "national judges are no more than the mouth
that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable
of moderating either its force or rigor." i 2s He therefore totally re-
jected any interpretative role for the independent judiciary.
[T]hough the tribunals ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to
such a degree as to be ever conformable to the letter of the law. Were they to
be the private opinion of the judge, people would then live in a society, with-
out exactly knowing the nature of their obligations. 12 9
Bereft of any interpretative role, Montesquieu's judges are consigned
to a highly formalistic, mechanical method of jurisprudence 3 0 This
accounts for Montesquieu's failure to see any necessity for profes-
sional judges.
Montesquieu further sought to remove all personal variation from
the judicial office so. as to force the population to revere the law in
the abstract, rather than the particular judge.131 Montesquieu also
combined the roles of judge and juror by rendering his judicial tribu-
nals the finders of both law and fact. These hybrid magistrates are to
be "drawn from the same social rank of the accused, or, in other
words, his peers."'132 Thus, legislators accused of misconduct need
not "demean" themselves before their "inferiors," but may be im-
peached before the upper chamber. 133 In addition, in serious crimi-
124. Id. at 160.
125. Id. at 153.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 154.
129. Id. at 153.
130. I. BERLIN, supra note 19, at 290.
131. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 158-59.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 159.
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nal trials the accused should have some privileges in choosing his
judges, or at least removing certain members from the tribunal.134
Under Montesquieu's formation, the judiciary is not given any
power over the other two branches.135 As the mere mouthpieces of
the law, the courts are not in a position to "check" the acts of the
other two branches, nor is there any need for a check upon such a
mechanistic judiciary. Montesquieu thus predates Marbury v.
Madison,138 from a theoretical as well as chronological standpoint.
On the other hand, Montesquieu treated the judiciary's power as ana-
lytically commensurate to that of the legislative and executive
branches. His criticism of the Roman Constitution, lacking a sepa-
rate judiciary,137 attests to the importance he attached to the judicial
function. Thus, although Montesquieu's judiciary lacked the power
later attributed to it by Chief Justice Marshall, The Spirit of the
Laws nevertheless firmly affixed the trinity of executive, legislative
and judicial powers into the parlance of modern political thought.138
How this trinity was adapted to the political realities of the new
world is the subject of the next section.
III. MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA
A. Pre-Revolutionary Influences
1. English Transition
The Spirit of the Laws was widely circulated in England immedi-
ately following its publication, and was translated into English sev-
eral years later. The feature of Montesquieu that most appealed to
English political thinkers was his independent judiciary.139 The
Spirit of the Laws influenced Blackstone, who unhesitatingly ac-
cepted Montesquieu's separation of powers doctrine.' 40 However,
Blackstone also "domesticated" Montesquieu by grafting his in-
dependent judiciary into the English common law tradition. Under
Blackstone's reformulation, Montesquieu's independent but emascu-
lated judiciary was transformed into a body of professional jurists
with power to interpret, as well as articulate, the law.141 This en-
134. Id. at 153.
135. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 93.
136. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
137. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, Bk. XI, at Ch. 11-19.
138. Id., at 88.
139. See F. FLETCHER, MONTEsQuIEu AND ENGLISH POLrrICS 137 (1939).
140. Id. at 138.
141. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 104.
larged judicial role would be important in fashioning Montesquieu's
interpretations in America.142
2. Montesquieu in Colonial America
Throughout the late colonial period, Montesquieu was widely read
among American Intelligentsia.143 Booksellers' advertisements re-
veal that Americans had abundant opportunities to purchase Montes-
quieu's books, the most prominent being The Spirit of the Laws. The
first known advertisement for an English translation of The Spirit of
the Laws appeared in 1762 in an Annapolis newspaper. 44 The New
York Society Library purchased a copy in 1773.145 Montesquieu was
also incorporated into the curricula of leading American universities.
In 1756 the College of Philadelphia included The Spirit of the Laws
among its recommended readings for seniors.146 Subsequently,
Princeton and Yale adopted Montesquieu into their curricula, with
Harvard and Brown following suit in the early 1780s.147
Despite the relatively restricted distribution in private libraries
and universities, Montesquieu was widely popularized in colonial
newspapers.148 Choice selections from The Spirit of the Laws and
The Persian Letters were printed as filler in local Gazettes, exhibiting
uniform respect for Montesquieu's work.149 Most of the newspaper
citations of Montesquieu during the colonial period were directly or
indirectly connected with the subject of liberty and the separation of
powers, with three times as many references to Book XI of The
Spirit of the Laws than to any other section.150
Montesquieu's separation of powers principle also figured into a
1762 dispute among Massachusetts legislators over whether judges
could concurrently serve as legislators.151 An opponent of a bill pro-
scribing dual office-holding argued that Montesquieu's separation of
powers principle only applied when the majority of inhabitants in
any one branch of government dominated the other. Because only a
few judges sat in the commonwealth's legislature, the doctrine was
not offended.152 During the French and Indian War, Montesquieu's
142. Id. at 105.
143. See generally P. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 176-180 (1940).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 177-79.
146. Id. at 177-78.
147. Id. at 178.
148. Id. at 72-87. See also F. MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 66 (Montesquieu's analy-
sis of republican principles reached a much wider audience than college curriculums).
149. P. SPURLIN, sup'a note 143, at 93; W. CARPENTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 51 (1930) (the writings of Montesquieu were accepted
in America as "political gospel").
150. P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 133.
151. M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 129-130.
152. Id.
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authority was also invoked in sermons extolling English liberty with
its balanced Constitution in contrast to French tyranny.153
B. Montesquieu and the American Revolution
In the rancorous years before the Declaration of Independence,
Montesquieu's discussion of the English Constitution was taken as a
model from which the actual politics of Parliament could be con-
trasted.'54 Indeed, according to Professor McDonald, "American
republicans regarded selected doctrines of Montesquieu as being vir-
tually on par with Holy Writ.' 55 While Blackstone was also fre-
quently cited, he was not relied on for the separation of powers
concept.' 56 Indeed, where sources were named, Montesquieu sur-
passed Locke in actual inches quoted, comparing favorably with
Blackstone.157
It was thought that Montesquieu's discussion in Book XI depicted
the political relationships in England, although this notion had "little
basis in fact."158 Nevertheless, on the American side of the Atlantic,
the disparity between Montesquieu's political model and the English
political reality was not perceived.15 9 Indeed, it was precisely because
the colonists believed that Parliament's conduct upset the balance of
the English Constitution that their political instincts were out-
raged.' 60 This helps explain why Montesquieu's theories were more
widely accepted by Colonial thinkers than among their contemporar-
ies in the mother land.' 6 '
153. 1 E. CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 130 (1981).
154. See M.J.C. VILE, supra note 44, at 127-35.
155. F. MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 80.
156. P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 136-37.
157. Id. at 157-58.
158. See W. CARPENTER, supra note 149, at 49.
159. Professor Carpenter argued:
Across the black morass of English political corruption the principles of Mon-
tesquieu loomed to American statesmen all the more vividly. The doctrine of
the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances appeared not
only correct as theories but also fitted in with colonial experience.
Id. at 51.
160. Id. at 57.
161. According to Professor Fletcher:
Almost at the very moment when Bentham was busy in England denying, as
against Blackstone and Rousseau, that the social law had any relation whatso-
ever with natural law, it was being affirmed with cataclysmic emphasis in
America that the relation between them was so close that, when social law
tries to break away from its first parent, Nature, it must at all costs be
brought back to it.
F. FLETCHER, supra note 139, at 203.
In 1774, William Bradford wrote to James Madison from the First
Continental Congress in Philadelphia. He wrote that the delegates
consulted Montesquieu in spelling out the rights of the colonists with
respect to the English Parliament. Indeed, according to Bradford, the
delegates selected Carpenters Hall as a meeting place due to its ex-
tensive library, and frequently invoked Montesquieu in their ad-
dresses.162 Delegates to the Second Continental Congress such as
Franklin, Jefferson, Sam and John Adams, Richard Henry Lee, and
Dr. Witherspoon were also acquainted with Montesquieu. 16 3
With the growing estrangement from England, colonists recognized
the irreconcilability between Montesquieu's separation of powers doc-
trine and the Parliamentary system of checks and balances pro-
pounded by British loyalists.164 After Thomas Paine exposed the
English system of checks and balances as a farce in his pamphlet
Common Sense, Americans recognized the separation of powers as
the primary guardian of liberty. 65 While these political sentiments
existed independently of Montesquieu's doctrine, The Spirit of the
Laws allowed for the transmutation of partisan grievances into a co-
herent and respectable body of political doctrine. 16 6 It is therefore
not surprising that Montesquieu's influence can be seen in the Decla-
ration of Independence.
During the war years, one finds scant reference to Montesquieu. 6 7
However, having already influenced the thinking of the Founding Fa-
thers, Montesquieu would re-emerge after the war as a major inspira-
tion in the construction of the newly independent republic.
IV. MONTESQUIEU'S INFLUENCE ON THE CONSTITUTION
A. Influence on the Framers
Most of the leading political figures during the Revolutionary and
Constitutional period were well acquainted with Montesquieu. He
was featured in the private libraries of such figures as John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, and George Mason.18 John Marshall, who did
162. Bradford wrote:
The Congress sits in the Carpenter's Hall in one room of which the City Li-
brary is kept [and] of which the Librarian tells me the Gentlemen make great
[and] constant use. by which we may conjecture that their measures will be
wisely planned since they debate on them like philosophers; for by what I was
told Vattel, Barlemaqui, Locke [and] Montesquieu seem to be the standar[d]s
to which they refer either in settling the rights of the Colonies or when a dis-
pute arises on the Justice or propriety of a measure.
1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 126-27 (Rutland ed. 1983).
163. P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 144.
164. See F. MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 82.
165. Id. at 84.
166. Id.
167. P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 158.
168. Id. at 57.
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so much to define the newly-ratified Constitution, purchased a copy
of The Spirit of the Laws in 1785.169
Montesquieu influenced James Madison as well. After graduating
from Princeton in 1771, Madison returned for further study. He
studied the writings of Montesquieu minutely as they formed the ba-
sis of President Witherspoon's classroom lectures.170 Like Montes-
quieu, Madison combined his interest in politics with profound
insight into human nature, reasoning primarily from historical anal-
ogy. 171 Madison's interest in Montesquieu extended beyond separa-
tion of powers to the underlying relationship between the spirit of
nations and the nature of government. 172
Although influenced by Montesquieu, Madison was willing to criti-
cize him even at this early date. Upon his election to the Continental
Congress in 1779, Madison concerned himself with the depreciation
of paper currency caused by the Revolutionary War. In an essay enti-
tled Money, which appeared in the National Gazette sometime be-
tween September 1779 and March 1780, Madison criticized
Montesquieu's theory of money.173 Contrary to Montesquieu's asser-
tion in Book XX of The Spirit of the Laws, Madison argued that
money only represents the exchange value of a particular item, not
its absolute value.' 7 4 Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated below,
Montesquieu continued to influence Madison's thinking throughout
his political life.
Thomas Jefferson's relationship with Montesquieu was more prob-
lematic. While he initially favored Montesquieu, his views changed
radically after 1790.175 Jefferson read Montesquieu in the course of
his legal education. 7 6 Between 1774 and 1776, he read and abstracted
chapters from The Spirit of the Laws in his Common Place Book.177
Jefferson devoted twenty-eight pages of his book to Montesquieu,
more than any other writer. 7 8 Jefferson extracted sentences, axi-
oms, and definitions from almost every book and chapter of The
169. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 185 (1916).
170. W. CARPENTER, supra note 149, at 74.
171. Id. at 75.
172. See J. MADISON, THE SPIRIT OF GOVERNMENTS, 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
233-34 (1792).
173. 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 162, at*306-07.
174. Id.
175. G. CHINARD, PENS'EES CHOISIES DE MONTESQUIEU TIR'EEs Du "COMMON-PLACE
BOOK" DE THOMAS JEFFERSON 19 (1925).
176. G. CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM 33 (1929).
177. See G. CHINARD, THE COMMON PLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 9 (1926).
178. Id. at 31.
Spirit of the Laws. Significantly, however, he made no excerpts from
the famous discussion of the English Constitution in book XI. 179
In Montesquieu, Jefferson found a clear definition of popular sov-
ereignty. The order of Montesquieu's forms of government - demo-
cratic republic, aristocratic republic, monarchy, and despotism -
precisely reflected Jefferson's governmental preference. 18 0 He saw
how democracy prospers and is corrupted, as well as the dangers of
permanent standing armies. He reproduced Montesquieu's theory of
federal republics and commented favorably on Montesquieu's reli-
gious tolerance.181 Finally, Jefferson was influenced by Montes-
quieu's discussion of the principle of governments, particularly the
necessity of virtue in republics. Referring to Montesquieu, Jefferson
wrote:
He considers political virtue or the Armor Patriae as the energetic principle of
a democratic republic; moderation, that of an aristocratic republic; honor, that
of a limited monarchy; and fear, that of a despotism; and shews that every
government should provide that its energetic principle should be the object of
the education of its youth .... That its laws also should be relative to the
same principle. In a democracy, equality and frugality should be promoted by
the laws, as they nurse the Armor Patriae .... 1 82
Jefferson read in Montesquieu that, because people exercise sover-
eignty through votes, the right of suffrage is fundamental to demo-
cratic republics.18 3 Early in his life, he favored governance by
aristocracy.'8 4 However, when Jefferson abandoned his aristocratic
predilections shortly before the Declaration of Independence, his de-
votion to Montesquieu required that he advocate universal suffrage
as well.185
At age eighteen, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
Apply yourself, without delay, to the study of the law of nature. I would rec-
ommend to your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and
Barlemaqui, I might mention other excellent writers on this subject, but if
you attend diligently to these you will not require any others.
1 8 6
Hamilton later relied on these writers in his contribution to the Fed-
eralist Papers.
179. Id. at 36.
180. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 177 (1948).
181. Professor Chinard states:
Everywhere in Spirit of Laws [Jefferson] found illustrations of the theory
which he maintained all his life that laws and constitutions are variable and
changing and must be altered in accordance with climate, local conditions, and
new circumstances. He even went one step further than Montesquieu in his
relativism, when he proclaimed that a generation had no right to bind by laws
the following generation.
G. CHINARD, supra note 177, at 37.
182. Id. at 259.
183. D. MALONE, supra note 180, at 178.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 86 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
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At the age of twenty-four, John Adams wrote in his diary:
I have began to read Spirit of Laws, and have resolved to read that work
through in order and with attention. I have hit upon a project that will secure
my attention to it, which is to write, in the margin, a sort of index to every
paragraph.
1 8 7
The following day Adams noted that, true to his intention, he read
100 pages of The Spirit of the Laws. 88 Seventeen years later, after
the Declaration of Independence, Adams invoked Montesquieu's
principle of government in a letter to a friend, lamenting the lack of
republican virtue in the nation. He feared that the colonialists had
become so corrupted by the principle of monarchy that they would be
unable to manifest the requisite frugality and virtue to sustain a re-
publican form of government. Though he does not cite Montesquieu
by name, the philosopher's influence can clearly be seen in Adam's
lamentation:
The Spirit of Republican Government is as little understood in America as its
spirit is felt. Ambition in a Republic is a great Virtue, for it is nothing more
than a Desire to Serve the Public and promote the Happiness of the People, to
increase the Wealth, the Grandeur, and Prosperity of the Community. This
Ambition is but another name for public Virtue, and desires to increase the
Wealth, the Grandeur, and the Glory of an Individual, at the Expense of the
Community, it is a heinous Vice .... We, in America are so contaminated,
with the Selfish Principles of Monarchy, and with that bastard, corrupted
Honour, that Monarchy inspires, that We have no Conception, no Imagination,
no Dream of the Passions and Principles, which support Republics.
1 8 9
It is significant that in this letter Adams retains Montesquieu's dic-
tum that virtue is necessary for the maintenance of republican gov-
ernments. As will be demonstrated below, by the time of the
Constitutional Convention Adams changed his view on this question.
B. Montesquieu at the Constitutional Convention
The years between 1776 and 1787 saw Montesquieu's greatest influ-
ence in America, for "[b]y the opening of the Constitutional Con-
vention in 1787, The Spirit of Laws had become an 'American'
classic."19o Unlike the colonial period, when Montesquieu was pri-
marily quoted on the English Constitution, newspapers cited him on
numerous topics including liberty, commerce, and the nature of laws
appropriate to republics, as well as the separation of powers.' 9 '
Newspaper articles of this period frequently emphasized virtue as a
187. See P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 88.
188. Id.
189. 5 THE PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 163 (Taylor ed. 1983).
190. See P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 177.
191. Id. at 176.
prerequisite to a republican form of government. 192 Through popu-
larization, Montesquieu had materially harmonized the sentiments of
the day into a coherent philosophy.
Montesquieu also influenced the formation of the various state con-
stitutions.193 Jefferson evinced Montesquieu's influence in his revi-
sion of Virginia's criminal code.194 Among the delegates to the
Convention, Montesquieu's writings were taken as "political gos-
pel."'1 95 Many such delegates read Montesquieu as preparatory mate-
rial.196 Indeed, besides studying Montesquieu himself, Madison
translated sections of The Spirit of the Laws for George Washing-
ton.197 Washington's notes reveal that he also studied Montesquieu
in preparation for the Convention.198
Montesquieu was the most frequently cited name in the establish-
ment of the three branches of government. However, the Conven-
tion delegates drew more deeply on Montesquieu, albeit without
specific attribution, in their conviction that their Constitution con-
form to what they called the genius of the American people. 9 9 The
Framers sought a moderate government congruent with the spirit of
the nation; a government not imposed from above but framed in ac-
cordance with socio-cultural imperatives.200
On June 1, the delegates debated the powers and terms of office to
be accorded to the executive branch of government. Some favored a
joint executive made up of several persons, while others argued for a
single executive patterned after the "monarchy" model. Wilson
spoke in favor of the latter:
We must consider two points of Importance existing in our Country -the ex-
tent and manners of the United States- the former seems to require the
vigor of Monarchy, the manners are ag[ainst] a King and are purely republi-
can -Montesquieu is in favor of confederated Republicks-- I am for such a
confed[eration] if we can take for its basis liberty, and can ensure a vigourous
execution of the Laws.
2 0 1
This quote suggests that the Framers were guided by Montesquieu's
192. Id. at 171.
193. Id. at 16.
194. THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM, supra'hote 176, at 93-94.
195. 1 M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 44
(1913).
196. P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 184.
197. Id. at 90.
198. Id.
199. F. MCDONALD, supra note 18, at 213 ("[I]f the delegates were agreed upon any
of Montesquieu's teachings, it was that government must be suited to the manners,
customs, and social institutions of a people"); see also W. SOLBERT, THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES xxxviii (1958).
200. See A. COHLER, MONTESQUIEU'S COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 148-53 (1988).
201. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 71 (1911).
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concept of a "spirit of nations" as much as his specific governmental
prescriptions.
Throughout the convention, delegates argued whether the states
were to be represented proportionally by population or by states.
This conflict, which threatened to scuttle the entire convention, jux-
taposed principles of democratic republicanism against the proposed
federal Constitution. Hamilton resolved this dispute through skillful
reliance on Montesquieu's discussion of the Achaen and Lycian con-
federacies of classical Greece. Utilizing this classical model, Hamil-
ton found historical precedent for the federal system framed within
the proposed Constitution.20 2 Madison also invoked the Lycian
League in a June 20 debate, stressing its system of proportional rep-
resentation and noting that Montesquieu approved of the arrange-
ment.2o3 This historical comparison would remain important during
the ratification process.
Montesquieu was again invoked on June 23 in a debate over
whether legislators should be renumerated. Madison argued that
some monetary inducement was necessary to assure that the best
men served in government. Butler disagreed, arguing that "[t]he
great Montesquieu says, it is unwise to entrust persons with power,
which by being abused operates to the advantage of those entrusted
with it."2o4 Madison responded that although he recognized the dan-
ger expressed by Butler, practicality dictated that legislators be
renumerated, despite the potential for abuse. Moreover, the high
honor of national service would also act as a disincentive for such
venality. 05
Prior to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the separation of
powers principle had been central to the establishment of the govern-
ments of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina. Combined with a
doctrine of checks and balances, it had become a staple of the Ameri-
can political creed. Like Montesquieu, the framers saw the separa-
tion of powers as much more than political subdivision. As a result,
they sought to accommodate the political structure to the social
structure so as to assure a "natural ' balance of social forces. 2 06
202. See F. MCDONALD, supra note 18i at 286; W. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF
FEDERALISM 70-71 (1964).
203. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 201, at 497.
204. Id. at 391.
205. Id. at 392.
206. As Professor Hofstadter explained:
What the Fathers wanted was known as "balanced government", an idea at
least as old as Aristotle and Polybius. This ancient conception had won new
On July 17, Madison invoked this principle in opposing a motion by
Doctor McClurg that the executive be elected by the legislature.
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legis[lative], Ex-
ecut[ive] and Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of
the separation that they should be independent of each there. The executive
[could] be independent of the Legislature [sic], if dependent on the pleasure of
that branch for a re-appointment. Why was it determined that the Judges
should hold their places by such a tenure? Because they might be tempted to
activate the Legislature, by an undue complaisance, and thus render the Leg-
islature the virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws. In like man-
ner a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the
Executor as well as the makers of laws; [and] then according to the observa-
tion of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed
in a tyrannical manner.2 0 7
Madison went on to explain that a union between the executive and
legislative powers is far more dangerous than one between the judici-
ary and legislature, correctly noting that Montesquieu only stressed a
separation between the former.208 The following day, Hamilton also
invoked Montesquieu in a major address to the convention, stressing
the inadequacy of the Confederacy and discussing the new constitu-
tional plan. His notes contain references to Montesquieu on the dan-
ger of standing armies, the English Constitution, the need for checks
and balances between social factions, and the principle of
government.20 9
While the Framers sought to pattern the American Constitution on
sanction in the eighteenth century, which was dominated intellectually by the
scientific work of Newton, and in which mechanical metaphors sprang as nat-
urally to men's minds as did biological metaphors in the Darwinian atmos-
phere of the late nineteenth century. Men had found a rational order in the
universe and they hoped that it could be transferred to politics, or as John
Adams put it, that governments could be "erected on the simple principles of
nature." Madison spoke in the most precise Newtonian language when he
said that such a "natural" government must be so constructed "that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places." A properly designed state, the Fathers believed,
would check interest with interest, class with class, faction with faction, and
one branch of government with another in a harmonious system of mutual
frustration.
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLIICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 8-9
(1948).
207. 2 M. FARRAND, Supra note 201, at 34.
208. Id. at 34-35.
209. Hamilton's truncated notes read:
Here I shall give my sentiments of the best form of government - not as a
thing attainable by us, but as a model which we ought to approach as near as
possible. British Constitution best form. Aristotle - Cicero-Montesquieu -
Neckar. Society naturally divides itself into two political divisions - the few
and the many. ... If [in] the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the
few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated. This
separation must be permanent. Representation alone will not do. Dema-
gogues will generally prevail. And if separated, they will need a mutual
check. This check is a monarch. Each principle ought to exist in full force, or
it will not answer its end.
Id. at 308-09.
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the English model, there were three divergent interpretations of the
English Constitution, each stemming from different legal theorists:
Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Hume.21 0 Blackstone's model provided
for an intermixing of governmental power, while Hume believed that
social stability was attained institutionally through a system of
checks and balances with little regard to social mores.211 In contrast,
Montesquieu and Bolingbroke favored a strict separation of autono-
mous powers patterned in accordance with the spirit of the nation.212
Ultimately, this model was rejected in favor of a modified system of
checks and balances in which power was exercised through an inter-
active relationship between the three branches of government. Mon-
tesquieu's specific separation of powers principle did not prevail at
the convention, but neither did Hume's, since the Constitution did
not conform to the British model.213 However, as Professor McDon-
ald explained, Montesquieu's overall theoretical model was vindi-
cated the day the new Constitution was announced.2 14
C. Montesquieu and the Rat~ication Debate
1. Republican Government in Large Territory
Central to the Antifederalists' opposition to the centralization of
power in the proposed Constitution was the idea that republican gov-
ernments only thrive in small territories with a small, homogeneous
population.215 Montesquieu's statement in Book XIX of The Spirit of
the Laws-that republican governments only flourish in small terri-
tories-was frequently cited by the Antifederalists to support their
contention that no universal system of law could reconcile the partic-
ular interests and disparate customs of the American states.216
210. F. McDONALD, supra note 18, at 209.
211. Id. at 210-12.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 258-60.
214. Id. at 260 ("[I]n an ultimate sense the Constitutions did reflect a Montes-
quiesan principle perhaps the most fundamental of them all: it provided for a govern-
ment that would itself be governed by laws, and by laws that conformed to the genius
and circumstances of the people.").
215. C. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALITS xxxix (1966).
216. Professor Kenyon wrote:
[The Antifederalists'] fundamental principle was the belief that republican
government could not be extended over a large geographical area with a nu-
merous and heterogeneous population. In this belief they appeared to be sus-
tained by the lessons of history and by the authority of reputable political
theorists.... They frequently referred to the opinion of Montesquieu, draw-
ing together that theorist's specific dictum on the incompatibility of republi-
canism with largeness and his more general principle that a people's form of
In The Federalist No. 9, Hamilton responded to these criticisms by
suggesting that the Antifederalists "seem not to have been appraised
of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his
work."217 Hamilton pointed out that the proposed Constitution main-
tained independent state governments, and therefore did not create
the danger that Montesquieu had warned against in Book XIX. Be-
cause every state could maintain governance over its individual char-
acteristics, the federal system preserved the unique qualities of each
state without imposing unnecessary uniformity.218 Hamilton then
noted the comparison between the proposed federal system and the
Lycian Confederacy, which Montesquieu had praised as "a model of
an excellent Confederate Republic."219 He advanced similar argu-
ments while defending the proposed Constitution at the New York
ratifying convention:
Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a principle that no government but a
despotism can exist in a very extensive country. This is a melancholy consid-
eration indeed. If it were founded on truth, we ought to dismiss the idea of
republican government, even for the state of New York. This idea has been
taken from a celebrated writer, who, by being misunderstood, has been the oc-
casion of frequent fallacies in our reasoning on political subjects. But the po-
sition has been misapprehended; and its application is entirely false and
unwarrantable: It relates only to democracies, where the whole body of the
people meet to transact business; and where representation is unknown ....
This application is wrong, in respect to all representative governments; but es-
pecially in relation to a confederacy of states, in which the supreme legisla-
ture has only general powers, and the civil and domestic concerns of the
people are regulated by the laws of the several states.2 2 0
For Hamilton and his fellow federalists, Montesquieu's dictum that
republican government flourishes in small territories was not incor-
rect, but only misunderstood by Antifederalists who cited the theo-
rist out of context.
2. Principle of Republican Government
The Antifederalists used Montescjuieu's principle of government in
attacking the deceptive manner in which the proposed Constitution
government must be adapted to their physical circumstances, their customs,
laws habits, mores, and general character.
Id. at cvi.
217. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
218. Hamilton stated:
The definition of a Confederate Republic seems simply to be an "assemblage
of societies," or an association of two or more States into one State. The ex-
tent, modifications and objects of the Federal authority are mere matters of
discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abol-
ished, so long as it exists by a Constitutional necessity for local purposes,
though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the
Union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of States, or a
confederacy.
Id. at 55.
219. Id. at 56.
220. 5 THE PAPERS OF ALExANDER HAMILTON 99-100 (H. Syrett ed. 1962).
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was adopted. Writing in the Massachusetts Centennial in January
1788, an anonymous author regarded the underhanded manner of
bringing forth a new Constitution as an ominous harbinger of life
under the proposed federal system. He saw the federal system as a
despotic encroachment of power upon the virtuous principle of re-
publican government existing in the States:
M. Montesquieu in his 'Spirit of Laws' . . . says, "As virtue is necessary in a
republick, and honour in a monarchy, so fear is necessary in a despotick gov-
erinent .. " Thus has a declaration been made in Pennsylvania in favor of a
government which substitutes fear for virtue, and reduces men from rational
beings to the level of brutes; and if the citizens of Massachusetts are disposed
to follow the example, and submit their necks to the yoke, they must expect to
be governed by the whip and goad.2 2 1
William Grayson, a prominent lawyer, advanced a more sophisti-
cated application of Montesquieu's principle of government in oppos-
ing Virginia's ratification of the Constitution. He argued that the
proposed Constitution established a static principle of government
which was unlikely to withstand the test of time. Pointing to the dy-
namic state of the American republic, Grayson argued that the spirit
of the nation was bound to change. It is therefore unwise, he argued,
to impose a static principle of government at this infant stage of the
American experience:
We are yet too young to know what we are fit for. The continual migration of
people from Europe, and the settlement of new countries on our western fron-
tiers, are strong arguments against making new experiments now in govern-
ment. When these things are removed, we can, with greater prospect of
success, devise changes. We ought to consider, as Montesquieu says, whether
the construction of the government be suitable to the genius and disposition of
the people, as well as a variety of other circumstances.
2 2 2
Grayson combined Montesquieu's principle of government with his
separation of powers notion and argued that the two were in. conflict.
Invoking Montesquieu, he suggested that the principle of republican
government conflicted with the structure of the proposed federal
system.223
221. C. KENYON, supra note 215, at 124-25 (emphasis in original).
222. Id. at 282.
223. Grayson opined:
What, sir, is the present Constitution? A republican government founded on
the principle of monarchy, with the three estates. It is like the model of
Tacitus or Montesquieu? Are there checks in it, as in the British monarchy?
There is an executive fetter in some parts, and as unlimited in others as a Ro-
man dictator. A democratic branch marked with the strong features of aris-
tocracy, and an aristocratic branch with all the impurities and imperfections
of the British House of Commons, arising from the inequality of representa-
tion and want of responsibility .... Do we love the British so well as to imi-
tate their imperfections? ... Are not all defects and corruption founded on an
In his Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States of America,2 John Adams found a similar disjuncture be-
tween Montesquieu's principles of government and the proposed fed-
eral Constitution. Adams argued that, contrary to Montesquieu's
assertion, virtue exists in all types of government and not just in re-
publics. Moreover, a republic is governed, not only by virtue, but
through fear and honor as well. Ever the cynic, Adams denied that a
society can be built on virtue, and accordingly found Montesquieu's
principles of government inapplicable to the proposed Constitution.
Rather, he suggested that it was the combination of virtue, honor and
fear in the proposed Constitution that rendered it worthy of public
support.225
Adams retained a lifelong fear of the multitude. He worried that
the rabble were incapable of manifesting the necessary restraint on
their avaricious impulses to possess the virtue which Montesquieu
held to be the basis of democratic governments. "Such severe frugal-
ity," he argued, "such perfect disinterestedness in public characters,
appear only, or at least most frequently, in aristocratical govern-
ments."226 Therefore, while deferential toward Montesquieu's contri-
bution, Adams denied that his abstract principles of government bore
any application to current political reality.
Must we bow with reverence to this great master of laws, or may we venture
to suspect that these doctrines of his are spun from his imagination? Before
he delivered so many grave lessons upon democracies, he would have done
well to have shown when or where such a government existed. Until some
one shall attempt this, one may venture to suspect his love of equality, love of
frugality, and love of the democracy, to be fantastical passions, feigned for the
regulation and animation of a government that never had a more solid exist-
ence than the flying island of Lagado.2 2 7
Although Adams dispensed with Montesquieu's principle of republi-
can government, many proponents of the Constitution did not. Mon-
tesquieu was widely cited on this and other subjects in the various
inequality of representation and want of responsibility? How is the execu-
tive? Contrary to the opinion of all the best writers, blended with the legisla-
tive. We have asked for bread, and they have given us a stone.
Id. at 284.
224. 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMs (C. Adams ed. 1851).
225. Adams wrote:
It is not true, in fact, that any people ever existed who loved the public better
than themselves, their private friends, neighbors, [etc.], and therefore this
kind of virtue, this sort of love, is as precarious a foundation for liberty as
honor or fear; it is the laws alone that really love the country, the public, the
whole better than any part; and that form of government which unites all the
virtue, honor, and fear of the citizens in a reverence and obedience to the
laws, is the only one in which liberty can be secure, and all orders and ranks,
and parties, compelled to prefer the public good before their own; that is the
government for which we plead.
Id. at 208.
226. Id. at 22.
227. Id. at 210.
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state ratification debates.228
Unlike Adams, Madison maintained that there were distinct princi-
ples unique to republican forms of government in accordance with
Montesquieu's dictum. In The Federalist No. 39, Madison argued that
the proposed Constitution best conformed to the republican spirit of
the American nation. While not specifically cited, Montesquieu's in-
fluence is clear:
The first question that offers itself is, whether the general form and aspect of
the government be strictly republican. It is evident that no other form would
be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the fundamen-
tal principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which
animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the
capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the convention there-
fore be found to depart from republican character, its advocates must abandon
it as no longer defensible. 22 9
In defending the power of the federal government to put down in-
surrections in the states pursuant to Article IV, Section 4 of the pro-
posed Constitution, Madison invoked Montesquieu's principles of
government. He argued that under the federal Constitution the
states share a common republican principle. Accordingly, "as long
... as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they
are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."230 When the states be-
come threatened by non-Republican principles, the unity of the
whole is threatened and military force is justified.
What is significant here is that Madison envisioned the federal sys-
tem as an ideological confederation; a unity of ideas. Federalism is
based on a common principle shared among the states. By urging cit-
izens to adopt the proposed Constitution, Madison urged them to ac-
cept certain principles of republican governance and acknowledge
certain socio-cultural uniformity amidst their disparate state inter-
ests. Thus, while states were free to differ over the implementation
of republican government, the principle of republican government, as
described by Montesquieu, provided that the unitary whole be
228. See P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 205-06.
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 250 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
230. Madison stated:
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republi-
can members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess author-
ity to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The
more intimate the nature of such a Union may be, the greater interest have
the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right
to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered
into should be substantially maintained.
Id. at 291.
greater than the sum of the disparate parts.23 1
3. Separation of Powers
Although Montesquieu's separation of powers principle had been
invoked by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention, the Anti-
federalists also made effective use of the theory. Pointing to the in-
termixing of some governmental functions among the various
branches of the proposed Constitution, the Antifederalists argued
that this deviated from the pure separation of powers doctrine alleg-
edly advanced by Montesquieu.
In an essay entitled Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution,232
published in December 1787, two writers inveighed against the as-
signment of impeachment powers to the Senate. Such an arrange-
ment, the authors argued, invested the legislative branch with
"judicial power" in violation of Montesquieu's famous dictum:
As the Senate judges on impeachments, who is to try the members of the Sen-
ate for abuses of this power! And none of the great appointments to office can
be made without the consent of the Senate. Such various, extensive, and im-
portant powers combined in one body of men, are inconsistent with all free-
dom; the celebrated Montesquieu tells us, that 'when the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magis-
trates, there can be no liberty.. : .' The president general is dangerously con-
nected with the Senate ... which will destroy all independency and purity in
the executive department; and having the power of pardoning without the
concurrence of a council; he may screen from punishment the most treason-
able attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when insti-
gated by his coadjudicators in the senate. 2 3 3
Viewing these criticisms in context, they are not without substan-
tial merit. In a Senate composed of twenty-six members, the danger
of a majority of fourteen joining into a faction was considerable. It
must be remembered that, prior to Marbury v. Madison, the concept
of judicial review was absent from these authors' political conscious-
ness. Accordingly, in their eyes, there was no "check" upon a junta
231. This view of a national society of societies can be seen in the remarks of James
Bowdoin, Jr. at the Massachusetts ratifying convention.
It was the answer of Solon's when he was asked what kind of a constitution he
had constructed for the Athenians, that he prepared as good a constitution of
government as the people would bear; clearly intimating that a constitution of
government should be relative to he habits, manners, and genius of the peo-
ple intended to be governed by it. As the particular state governments are
relative to the manners and genius of the inhabitants of each state, so ought
the general governments to be an assemblage of the principles of all the gov-
ernment; for, without this assemblage of the principles, the general govern-
ment will not sufficiently apply to the genius of the people confederated; ... it
must necessarily fail in its execution because, agreeable to the idea of Solon,
the people would not bear it ..... Baron Montesquieu observes, that all gov-
ernments ought to be relative to their particular principles ....
P. SPURLIN, supra note 143, at 209-10 (emphasis in original).
232. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 215, at 53.
233. Id.
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of Senators bullying an impeachment-fearful executive into sub-
verting constitutional principles.
In response to these well-founded criticisms, Madison invoked
Montesquieu's separation of powers dictum to the proposed federal
Constitution. Madison explained:
The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated
Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science
of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most
effectually to the attention of mankind.2 3
4
Madison then argued that the British Constitution formed the basis
of Montesquieu's separation of powers principle:
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the di-
dactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the
immortal Bard as the perfect model from which the ... epic art were to be
drawn ... so this great political critic appears to have viewed the constitution
of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirrour of
political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the
several characteristic principles of that particular system. 2 3
5
Looking at the actual British Constitution of the 1640s, Madison
found no pure separation of powers; instead, governmental functions
intermixed. Given Montesquieu's approval of the British system,
Madison reasoned that he must have been thinking of something less
than a pure separation of powers when he announced his famous
dictum:
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided it may clearly be in-
ferred, that in saying 'there can be no liberty where the legislative and execu-
tive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates', or 'if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers'
he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or
no controul over the acts of each other. His meaning... can amount to no
more than ... that where the power of one department is exercised in the
same hands which possesses the whole power of another department, the fun-
damental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.
2 3 6
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
235. Id. at 324-325. There is reason to believe that Madison was somewhat disingen-
uous here. A dispassioned reading of Book XI, Chapter 6 suggests that Montesquieu's
use of the English constitution does not rise to Homeric proportions. While entitled
"On the Constitution of England," the section is more a general application of Montes-
quieu's theory than a specific treatment of the English political system. Moreover,
Montesquieu clearly stated that the actual political system in England does not neces-
sarily conform to his description: "It is not my business to examine whether the Eng-
lish actually [enjoy] this liberty or not. Sufficient it is for my purpose to observe that
it is established by their laws; and I inquire no further." MoNTESQUIEu, supra note 1,
Bk. XI, Ch. 6, at 162. Madison thus appears to be overstating Montesquieu's reliance
on the English Constitution in forming his separation of powers theory.
236. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 325-26 (emphasis in original). This statement sug-
gests a different reading of THE FEDERALIST No. 47 than is commonly given by federal
courts faced with a separation of powers question. Most courts quote Madison's use of
Through this effective use of syllogism, Madison invoked Montes-
quieu's authority, not for a pure separation of powers with which he
is commonly associated; but rather in favor of a modified, incomplete,
separation of governmental powers.
While Madison could finesse the theoretical issue of whether Mon-
tesquieu advocated a complete or partial separation of powers, the
substantive fears of a Senatorial junta subverting constitutional liber-
ties remained unanswered. Given the power of the Senate to im-
peach the executive, what was to keep a faction of legislators from
intimidating the executive into surrendering his Constitutional pre-
rogative? The answer lies in the concept of judicial review expressed
by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78. Hamilton argued that the life-
time tenure of federal judges during good behavior provides an effec-
tive bulwark against encroachments by the legislative branch.2 3 7
Hamilton cited Montesquieu's dictum that the judiciary is the least
powerful of the three branches of government. Accordingly, "so long
as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and
the executive liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
alone." 23 8 To Hamilton, an independent and life-tenured judiciary
therefore forms a "citadel of the public justice and the public
security."239
Hamilton reasoned that because the legislature derives its power
from the Constitution, "[n]o legislative act... contrary to the Consti-
tution, can be valid."24 Accordingly, judicial review is necessary to
assure that the legislative body does not exceed its constitutional
authority.
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the constitution could intend to enable
the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their con-
stituents. It is for more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to
Montesquieu to support a "pure" separation of powers. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 721 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 999 (1983). However, insofar as these
citations seek to invoke Madison's authority, they are completely out of context.
Madison was using that very quote from Montesquieu to argue against a pure separa-
tion of powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 cannot be read to support decision such as
Bowsher v. Synar, in which the Supreme Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman
scheme on the basis of a minor technicality that the U.S. Treasurer was an executive
appointment.
237. Hamilton explained:
The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial
magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the modern improvements
in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the
despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the
encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best
expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, up-
right, and impartial administration of the laws.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
238. Id. at 523.
239. Id. at 524.
240. Id.
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be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their au-
thority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A Constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a
fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as
well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred;
or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents. Nor does this conclu-
sion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial power to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and
that where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposi-
tion to that of the people, declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be
governed by the latter rather than the former.2 4 1
Beginning with Montesquieu's premise that liberty depends upon a
separation of governmental powers, Hamilton reached the ines-
capable conclusion that this separation can only be maintained
through an independent, life-tenured judiciary vested with the power
to strike down unconstitutional dictates of the legislature. While this
concept of judicial review finds little textural support in The Spirit of
the Laws, it was discovered by 1788 that, in order to maintain to co-
herence of Montesquieu's trinity of government, such review was a
logical necessity.242 Montesquieu and Hamilton saw the same gov-
ernmental principle effectuated by an independent judiciary even if
they accorded different powers to their judges. Montesquieu under-
stood that, by forming a bulwark between the people and their gov-
ernment, an independent judiciary served as the guarantor of
moderate government. Hamilton felt that an independent judiciary,
acting as a check upon popular government, would preserve individ-
ual rights. Thus, while they differed in their means, Montesquieu
and Hamilton worked toward the same ends.2 43
241. Id. at 525 (emphasis in original).
242. Professor Corwin explained how Montesquieu's separation of powers concept
led inexorably to an independent judiciary with the power to check legislative enact-
ments, despite the fact that such power was not envisioned in THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS:
The Constitutional Fathers seized with avidity upon Montesquieu's picture of
a constitution, whose well devised checks kept the organs of government most
normally in a 'state of reposed or inaction.' The federal government was bal-
anced against the states and these against the government; each portion of a
triple-branched legislature was set against the others; the people were made a
curb upon their representative and they upon the people. It was then but a
step farther, and a very rational one, to set the judiciary against the
legislature....
2 E. CORWIN 36-37 (1981).
243. See A. COHLER, supra note 200, at 168.
V. MONTESQUIEU AND THE NEW REPUBLIC
A. Montesquieu and the Supreme Court
In the early years of the American Republic, Montesquieu was
often cited for authority in judicial opinions. In the 1784 case of Tal-
bot v. Commanders and Owners of Three Brigs,244 the Pennsylvania
High Court of Errors was faced with a jurisdictional dispute over
whether Pennsylvania had admiralty jurisdiction to resolve a dispute
over three ships captured during the Revolutionary War. Citing
Montesquieu's discussion of international relations, the court con-
cluded that admiralty fell under the law of nations and thus the
Pennsylvania court had properly exercised its jurisdiction. 245
In Cooper v. Telfair,246 the United States Supreme Court faced a
challenge to a Georgia bill of attainder confiscating the estate of Basil
Cooper, an exiled loyalist. Cooper contended that because he had
never been tried and convicted of treason by a court of law, the bill
constituted a legislative usurpation of judicial authority violative of
Montesquieu's dictum that judicial and legislative powers be kept
separate and distinct. 247 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that because no court had jurisdiction over the exiled
Cooper, the Georgia legislature had properly acted within its pow-
ers.248 Montesquieu was also cited by the Supreme Court in Fletcher
v. Peck 249 for the proposition that legislatures maintain the power to
dispose of land.
in Brown v. United States,250 the Supreme Court was faced with a
challenge to the seizure of timber belonging to a British subject after
the declaration of The War of 1812. The plaintiff cited Montesquieu,
who favored the British practice of not' seizing enemy property
before determining how the enemy would treat the property of Brit-
ish subjects.251 Chief Justice Marshall agreed, holding that a declara-
tion of war by Congress does not, in itself, provide the legal basis for
seizure of enemy property.252 However, writing in dissent, Justice
Story argued that the seizure was proper. He distinguished Montes-
quieu by pointing out that the British law of warfare only applied
where the foreign subject was on British soil; here the owner of the
timber was in Britain at the time of seizure.253 Thus, sixty-five years
244. 1 U.S. 95 (1784).
245. Id. at 106.
246. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
247. Id. at 17-18.
248. Id. at 18-19.
249. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
250. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
251. Id. at 114.
252. Id. at 129.
253. Id. at 143.
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after The Spirit of the Laws was published, Montesquieu remained
strong enough as a legal authority that a Supreme Court Justice
elected to distinguish his precepts from the facts of a particular case
rather than contravene them directly.
Besides his law of nations, Montesquieu was also cited by the
Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh254 to the effect that because
Indians remained in the state of nature they were incapable of con-
veying estates in land.255 Finally, in the 1823 case of Green v. Bid-
dle,256 the plaintiffs invoked Montesquieu's authority and argued that
a particular statutory construction of a real estate dispute would dis-
courage industry and agriculture. 257 While the Supreme Court was
not swayed by this argument, it is nevertheless significant that liti-
gants regarded Montesquieu's jurisprudence as persuasive authority
on questions other than the separation of powers or the law of
warfare.
B. Montesquieu's Decline & America's Maturation
While the previous section illustrates that Montesquieu continued
to be invoked in the years after ratification, his precepts gradually
evolved from political gospel to persuasive authority. The fact that
Montesquieu was so effectively invoked by both sides of the ratifica-
tion debate necessarily damaged his authoritive power in current
political matters. It is therefore not surprising that in the years fol-
lowing ratification, Montesquieu's influence declined among Ameri-
can political thinkers.
The most profound critic of Montesquieu in the post-ratification
period was Thomas Jefferson. While Montesquieu had greatly influ-
enced Jefferson in his early years, Jefferson's opinion of the theorist
changed radically after 1790.2M In 1810, Destutt de Tracy, a French
republican intellectual, sent Jefferson a manuscript of a critical com-
254. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
255. Id. at 567 n.a, 570 n.a.
256. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 1 (1823).
257. In arguing that Virginia property law covered estates established when Vir-
ginia ceded Kentucky, the plaintiffs stated:
The system of legislation now in question, does but follow the maxims laid
down by Montesquieu, that the laws should encourage industry; that the more
climate, and other circumstances, tend. to discourage the cultivation of the
earth, the more should the legislator excite agriculture; and that those laws
which tend to monopolize the lands, and take from individuals the proprietary
spirit, augment the effect of those unfavourable circumstances.
Id. at 36.
258. G. CHINARD, supra note 175, at 19.
mentary on The Spirit of the Laws. Jefferson translated the work
into English and arranged for its publication in America.259 To pro-
tect de Tracy from Napoleonic persecution, A Commentary and Re-
view of Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws was published anonymously. 260
Jefferson's critical introduction to the monograph stands in marked
contrast to his earlier infatuation with the theorist and his work.26'
Montesquieu's immortal work on the Spirit of Laws, could not fail, of course,
to furnish matter for profound consideration. I have admired his vivid imagi-
nation, his extensive reading, and dextrous use of it. But I have not been
blind to his paradoxes, his inconsistencies, and whimsical combinations. And I
have thought the errors of his book, the more important to be corrected, as its
truths are numerous, and of powerful influence on the opinions of
societies. 2 6 2
In a subsequent letter to de Tracy, Jefferson is even more critical of
Montesquieu:
I had, with the world, deemed Montesquieu's work of much merit; but saw in
it with every thinking man, so much paradox, of false principle and misap-
plied fact, as to render its value equivocal on the whole. 26 3
Jefferson's changed opinion of Montesquieu can be attributed in
part to his tendency later in life to "burn his old idols."264 Perhaps
more important was Jefferson's presence in France as ambassador at
the very time when French political thinkers with whom Jefferson
closely associated were castigating Montesquieu as an Anglophile. 265
Moreover, given Jefferson's critical attitude toward the British, it is
hardly surprising that Jefferson regarded Montesquieu's treatment of
the English Constitution as overly deferential.266 Finally, upon Jef-
ferson's return to America, his political enemies frequently cited
Montesquieu. 267
However, much of the explanation for Jefferson's disaffection with
Montesquieu would properly seem to rest with Montesquieu's theo-
ries per se. While often cited on the virtue of republican govern-
ments, Monteiquieu was, essentially, a Burkean conservative who
eschewed radical change and favored aristocratic principles of gov-
259. D. MALONE, THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 208-209 (1981).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. D. DE TRACY, A COMMENTARY AND REVIEW OF MONTESQUIEU'S SPIRIT OF LAWS
(T. Jefferson trans. 1811).
263. 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181 (Ford ed. 1905) (letter to de Tracy,
January 26, 1811).
264. G. CHINARD, SUPra note 175, at 19.
265. See supra note 177, at 34-35.
266. Id. at 33. See also D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN, supra note 180, at
176 (Jefferson revolted against Montesquieu because of his affinity for the British
monarchy and conviction that republicanism only survives in small territories).
267. See, e.g., 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON supra note 263, at 220-21 (letter
to Nathanial Niles, March 22, 1801) (criticizing Montesquieu's dictum that republican
government cannot thrive in large territories).
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ernment over democratic republicanism.26 8 Given Jefferson's vigor-
ous support for the French Revolution and "The Rights of Man," as
well as his conviction that one generation had no right to bind the
next generation through its laws, it is understandable that he would
find his philosophy somewhat removed from Montesquieu's.
Although Madison did not repudiate Montesquieu as completely as
Jefferson did, he did grow critical of the theorist in the years follow-
ing ratification. In his anonymous Helvidius essay published in 1783,
Madison criticized President Washington's declaration of neutrality
in the French-English War as an affront to the separation of powers.
In preparing a gentle critique of Washington's action, Madison sent a
draft of his essay to Jefferson, requesting that the latter check his
Montesquieu citations as they had been written from memory.2 69
When the essay was printed, it revealed a more jaundiced view of
Montesquieu than Madison had presented in The Federalist No. 47
five years earlier:
Writers such as Locke and Montesquieu, who have discussed more particu-
larly the principles of liberty and the structure of government, lie under the
same disadvantage of having written before these subjects were illuminated
by the events and discussions which distinguish a very recent period. Both of
them too are evidently warped by a regard to the particular government of
England, to which one of them owed allegiance, and the other professed an
admiration bordering on idolatry. Montesquieu, however, has rather distin-
guished himself by enforcing the reasons and the importance of avoiding a
confusion of the several powers of government, than by enumerating and de-
fining the powers which belong to each particular class.
2 7 0
John Adams also expressed a more critical view of Montesquieu in
the years following ratification. As an old man, he discovered a vol-
ume of Condercet in his library belonging to James Madison. Adams
took the occasion to discuss Condercet and his contemporaries. He
praised the "original genius" of those philosophers while at the same
time criticizing the simplicity of their political models.271 Yet the
pragmatic politician in Adams also appreciated the political genius of
Montesquieu and his contemporaries. While history and philosophy
have proven the flaws of Montesquieu's analysis, sixty years after
first reading The Spirit of the Laws, Adams still appreciated the ge-
nius of the work:
I am not an implicit believer in the inspiration or infallibility of Montesquieu.
268. See M. RIcHTER, supra note 54, at 101.
269. 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 59 (letter to Thomas Jefferson August 12,
1793).
270. Helvidius No. 1, The National Gazette, Aug. 24, 1793, reprinted in 15 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON at 266-68.
271. 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 256-57 (Adams ed. 1856).
On the contrary, it must be acknowledged, that some.., have detected many
errors in his writings. But all their heads consolidated into one mighty head
would not equal the depth of his genius, or the extent of his view. Voltaire
alone excels or equals him. When a writer on government disposes, sneers, or
argues against mixed governments, of a balance in government, he instantly
proves himself an ideologian. To reason against a balance, because a perfect
one cannot be composed or eternally preserved, is just as good sense as to rea-
son against all morality, because no man has been perfectly virtuous.2 7 2
With the exception of Jefferson, there was no profound hostility
toward Montesquieu--only a less reverent view of him. Much of this
change can be attributed to the passage of time. Montesquieu pub-
lished The Spirit of the Laws in 1748, having attained political matur-
ity during the reign of Louis XIV. The Europe on which he based his
observations accepted the divine right of kings as standard political
cant. Therefore, in the revolutionary period after 1789, Montes-
quieu's observations appeared dated, and his precepts of government
anachronistic.
On a deeper level, in the years after ratification one finds more
self-assuredness among American political thinkers than in the Colo-
nial or Revolutionary periods. The Framers had, after all, crafted
their own self-sustaining system of government and were therefore
less in need of outside authority to justify political events. While still
revered as a great thinker, Montesquieu's theories have been largely
incorporated within the American political structure; far stronger
testimony to his greatness than all the verbal plaudits laid upon him
in earlier years combined.
Montesquieu's lasting influence was not his partisan proscriptions
or empirical findings. Rather, as James Madison explained, Montes-
quieu is honored for providing western civilization with a new system
for understanding the interrelationships between law, politics, cul-
ture and society:
Montesquieu was in politics not a Newton or a Locke, who established immor-
tal systems, the one in matter, the other in mind. He was in his particular
science what Bacon was in universal science. He lifted the veil from the
venerable errors which enslaved opinion, and pointed the way to those lumi-
nous truths of which he had but a glimpse himself.2 7 3
VI. CONCLUSION
This discussion has demonstrated that Montesquieu's influence
upon the Framers of the American Constitution extended far beyond
the separation of powers principle. Indeed, the strict separation of
powers enunciated in The Spirit of the Laws was belied by the Amer-
ican practice of judicial review which, since Marbury v. Madison, has
become an integral component of our political system. Judicial re-
272. Id.
273. The Spirit of Governments, 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON supra note 162,
at 233.
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view, as practiced in the United States, is more representative of
Hume's discussion of checks and balances than Montesquieu's analy-
sis in The Spirit of the Laws.
This focus on Montesquieu's separation of powers dictum not only
obfuscates his more important contributions, it substantively mis-
states his position. Montesquieu's oft-cited dictum that liberty de-
pends upon a separation of governmental powers, quoted by Madison
in The Federalist No. 47, does not advocate a total separation of gov-
ernmental structures, but rather a separation of the disparate func-
tions. Montesquieu himself endowed the legislature with the judicial
function of adjudicating criminal misconduct by legislators. More-
over, Madison's invocation of Montesquieu in The Federalist No. 47
was in response to antifederalist criticisms that the new Constitution
violated Montesquieu's separation of powers principle. Madison cor-
rectly argued that Montesquieu did not require that all structures of
government be kept separate and distinct.274
Montesquieu's greater influence was teaching the Framers that any
system of laws rests, ultimately, upon the social customs of the soci-
ety being governed. In the rancorous years leading up to the Decla-
ration of Independence, Montesquieu legitimized colonists' perceived
disassociation between British law and American custom. After the
Revolution, when entrusted with creating their own legal structure,
the Framers remembered Montesquieu lesson subordinating their
legal structure to the governing spirit of the American nation. The
resiliency of their Constitution, two hundred years after its ratifica-
tion, is proof of the Framers' accurate reading of Montesquieu's dicta.
In the current legal environment, Montesquieu's analysis of the re-
lationship between law and culture can help explain the ongoing
legal wrangle over issues such as school prayer and abortion, and
hopefully lead to a more harmonious resolution of such conflicts.
274. Montesquieu provides no authority for recent decisions such as Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732 (1986), in which the Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman
bill merely because the treasurer, entrusted with the non-discretionary obligation of
cutting the budget once the target was not reached, was an executive officer. Under
Gramm-Rudman, the respective functions of the legislature and the executive branch
remained distinct; neither Montesquieu nor Madison would have been offended. Simi-
larly, in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 61 (1984), the fact that federal judges sat
on the sentencing commission would not, from a structural standpoint, contravene
Montesquieu's theoretical framework. However, a functionalist argument that the
presence of judges on the sentencing commission or a judges' implementation of the
sentencing guidelines somehow interferes with their constitutional function as neutral
and detached magistrates might be more compelling from a Montesquieuan
perspective.
Framed in Montesquieu's terminology, attempts by the Supreme
Court to construct value-neutral principles for adjudicating issues of
deeply held religious conviction are consigned to failure as legal en-
croachments upon social custom. Where a court acts in contravention
to the collective conscience of sizeable portions of the population,
Montesquieu teaches that social strife is inevitable. From this per-
spective, it is understandable that Supreme Court decisions such as
Baker v. Cart275 and Brown v. Board of Education,276 which assigned
legal rights to individuals, although momentous in their impact, have
been largely accepted by the populace; decisions implicating funda-
mental values such as Engel v. Vitale277 and Roe v. Wade278 remain
the fodder of social disruption.
Applying Montesquieu's analysis to current legal conflicts over ul-
timate values will produce a more modest assessment of what the
legal system can accomplish; law can change what was established by
law, but custom must be left to change custom. Value conflicts in
American society should be adjudicated in the forum in which values
are made: family, neighborhood, religious organizations, trade un-
ions, community, school, and media. The legal system should recuse
itself from adjudicating value conflicts, confining its emphasis to pro-
tecting the rights of citizenship and similar legally created entitle-
ments.279 Such Montesquieuan deference to the habits of the heart
of the American people is sure to produce short term disappointment
among those who seek to improve society through judicial channels.
However, just as the Framers' trust in Montesquieu helped assure
the resiliency of their Constitution throughout two-hundred years of
tumult and strife, so today will social comity be preserved so long as
jurists heed Montesquieu's dictum and respect the natural divisions
of authority within their particular societies.
275. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (affirming one-man, one-vote principle as constitutionally
mandated by the fourteenth amendment).
276. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down separate but equal doctrine as constitutional
justification of racial segregation).
277. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding non-denominational school prayer unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment).
278. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (affirming constitutional right to abortion during first tri-
mester of pregnancy).
279. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1986).
